Day 227, October 7. Summary of Arestovych and Feygin daily broadcast. This update was provided by Stepan: https://twitter.com/childsacrifice1
Crimean bridge:
2 parts of the bridge collapsed and the railroad part of the bridge is partially damaged. Heavy vehicles such as tanks will not be able to cross the road part of the bridge. This imposes difficulties on the supply of the southern group of Russian forces. It is unknown how the bridge will react to heavy cargo being transported over it. the capacity of the bridge has been halved for at least 10-14 days. We now know how the bridge reacts to explosives and it is weaker than the Antonivsky bridge. Arestovich says that the Antonivsky bridge has been hit with 120-140 HIMARS missiles.
Russian political struggle:
According to some preliminary sources, they wanted to remove Shoygu. Shoygu then assigned Surovikin as the commander of Russian forces. Military forces around Moscow were brought on high alert, according to one version some military commanders were arrested, according to another no one was arrested and this was simply a test of readiness. The FSB is responsible for guarding the bridge. The FSB have since tried to distance themselves from this. Arestovich believes that the Russians will try to determine who among themselves blew up the Bridge, not the Ukrainians. He also said that many people within the Russian establishment are now more worried about internal events than about the war. He says that the explosion may well have been the work of a faction within the Kremlin as opposed to a Ukrainian strike. This is very good and means that “the end is coming sooner than we all expected”.
Other versions:
Arestovich says that if it had been a Ukrainian missile strike the explosion would have looked very different. No missile is capable of such a large explosion. A missile would also have been seen. Boats, underwater barges, and underwater explosions also do not make sense. The army may use this explosion to blame the FSB for the loss of Kherson as a result of logistical difficulties. We will see all this unfold in 2-3 weeks. A drone or a missile would have been seen and would have not penetrated the formidable air defense net. The appointment of Surovikin is to our advantage, as he manages to even shock Russian generals with his stupid brutality.
Supply of Russian forces in Kherson:
These forces have been alarmed by this strike as the transport of supplies through the south of occupied Ukraine is very long, difficult, and covered by Ukrainian HIMARS. As evidence to this point, yesterday something in the railway hub of Ilovaisk was blown up. Even if the railway part of the bridge is operational, the road section also represented a large portion of their supply, including equipment driving unassisted. Now only 1 out of 4 lanes is operational and no heavy vehicles (including loaded KAMAZ trucks) can pass. This all further worsens their already bad supply situation. Radio intercepts already indicate panic.
Propaganda:
Russian propaganda does not have a single script, because there is no evidence of Ukrainian involvement. Thus, there are different versions emerging in the propaganda machine. Arestovich believes “101%” that Putin is looking for perpetrators within his own ranks because there is not a single version for propagandists to follow. They may launch revenge strikes on civilian infrastructure to calm vatniks but people who cannot formulate a single version of events are not ready to use nuclear weapons. They cannot explain an explosion on a bridge. How will they explain a nuclear strike?
Front-line situation in Kherson:
both sides have taken a tactical pause. Ternovi Pody northeast of Posad Pokrovske was taken, this starts to form an interesting salient, but this is not the tempo that was at the beginning of the offensive. Similar things are happening in the Svatove direction in Kharkiv. Both sides are amassing forces.
Overall frontline situation:
Currently, the most important factor is not terrain or weather but the availability and quantity of reserves on both sides. Arestovich estimates that the Russians do not have large reserves, but they may commit dep
Arestovich estimates that the Russians do not have large reserves, but they may commit depleted units filled with mobilized personnel even though these are not combat-ready yet. Some sources even indicate that the Russians may be preparing a counterattack in the Svatove direction. Changes on the front will depend on who will first commit their reserves, and where.
