Below is a translation of a long blog post by the Russian volunteer Murz whom we’ve covered extensively during the past several months. In this post, Murz, who has been previously critical of the way the Russian Army is conducting the “special operation”, goes over the potential of a Ukrainian offensive in winter and shows that Russia is completely unprepared for it in terms of armoured vehicles, communication, defensive lines, artillery, and manpower.
This is perhaps the most critical of his texts and was shared by Igor Girkin as “recommended for reading”. The author has a certain way of constructing sentences so we apologise for any misunderstanding while reading.
In pursuit of “positives”
Sorry, there will be a lot of swearing. It was actually supposed to be a large and rather strict text, but firstly, I doubt that in this format it will even reach anyone, usually when you yell obscenely at someone, it reaches them faster, and secondly, I simply don’t have time for a big, strict, practically academic analysis of all the garbage. So sorry, it will be short and with swearing.
Those who read my TG channel could already notice that a terrible thing happened to me recently – I watched Russian TV. The story of the morons from “Russia-24” who said that, as it turns out, it is possible to “dismantle Ukrainian fortifications” from a 57-mm anti-aircraft gun, left an indelible impression on me. Well, that is, for any person who understands at least a little about military affairs and who has generally seen these fortifications at least in a photo, such a phrase cannot cause anything but hysterical laughter.
The finale of the news release generally made me doubt that I was watching Russian TV. The weather forecast included a story, typically Ukrainian in essence and presentation, that in Ukraine, the weather is kind of terrible – solid ice, in Dnepropetrovsk so many buses have crashed due to ice. Most of the rest of the time was devoted to rituals about the fact that not only Ukraine, but finally the whole of Europe will freeze this winter.
“The burghers are alarmed,” the announcer said, completing the “forecast”, “by the fact that black smoke poured out of the pipes of German thermal power plants!”
Apparently, it was such a special test moment to see how everything in the viewer’s head has calibrated, because along these words they showed ordinary white steam coming from these same pipes. “If you see white smoke, watch the news again in an hour and repeat until the smoke turns black” or something like that.
After leaving Kherson, the public, instead of soberly assessing the situation, began, with the active help of the media, military correspondents, and all other available means, to suck out the “positivity” from any bullshit, often demonstrating just the opposite – complete fuck ups. A typical example of this, again, was in my TG – a video with grandiose music from the 127th division, in which Ukrainian grenade launchers are allowed to approach tanks at 50 meters. At the 10th month of the war. Unteachable. Moreover, no one is embarrassed by the fact that in the frame it is clear that the tank missed with a return shot – the shell passed over the trench and exploded off-screen. Loud and prolonged applause. Pew Pew! We attack!
Separate fierce fuck-up are the constantly popping up videos from the 1st Army Corps of the DPR showing firing from tanks from closed positions, practiced on a regular basis. The horror here, of course, is not that tanks shoot from closed positions, they can do it, a good tankman should be able to do it, moreover, tankmen were trained for this in 2016-2017 and the KCPN carried manuals for this on the topic. The horror is that with the silent catastrophic lack of shells in artillery (you can’t talk about it, because then someone will have to answer for it, but no one wants to), it was decided to replace artillery with tanks on a regular basis. For tanks, shells seem to still exist. I am not at all surprised, by the way, that the well-deserved media prostitute Vladlen Tatarsky supported this “good undertaking”. More like not surprised. Then he will, with a completely innocent look, expose the consequences of this garbage and, wringing his hands, ask – “What kind of bitch ordered this to be done?” And everyone is like, “Yes, yes! Who could it be?”
In reality, such shooting is an emergency temporary measure in a situation where it is necessary to cover a large concentration of the enemy, and there is no free artillery at hand or it is impossible to use it because of the operational counter-battery fire, to which the tank, due to thick armor, is much less susceptible than self-propelled artillery guns and, especially, the towed guns in which the crew and ammunition load are not covered at all. Smooth-bore tank guns are not designed for what they are now doing all day long: continuously bombarding enemy positions with high-explosive fragmentation shells. Modern tank guns are made smooth-bore so that they can be used to accelerate an armor-piercing projectile, in the jargon – a “crowbar”, to an initial speed of 1700-1800 meters per second (For comparison, the rifled 152-mm howitzer D-20, aka – 2S3 “Akatsiya”, if we are talking about self-propelled guns, the combat missions of which the tankmen are trying to perform, has an three times smaller speed of a high-explosive fragmentation projectile output). The task of the tank is to destroy enemy tanks with direct fire in a tank battle with such “crowbars”. If – you lose the barrel, you won’t hit anything, the enemy will destroy you first. And the survivability of the barrel of a tank gun, it is much less than that of a rifled howitzer. And the tanks that are doing all this are no longer new, the barrels have already been used, so to destroy targets from closed positions, a large consumption of shells is required, which wears out the barrels even more. In the LPR, still very much before the SMO, there was already a situation at one time when in one of the division’s tank barrels were shot to the point where further training firing at the range would deprive the tanks of combat value in the future, so the unit at the range began to shoot from 14.5 -mm inserts with cartridges from the KPVT machine gun. Usually, by the way, they start just with shooting from the “inserts”, and then they already train with combat ammo, but this is our army, after all.
But in combat, you can’t shoot like that. And the guns on the old T-64/72/80 tanks, the old models of the 2A46 gun, they can’t be changed without dismantling the turret. That is, we are now methodically putting out of action the last surviving tanks of the People’s Militia Corps, trophied tanks captured in a tolerable condition, and those removed from storage, are all urgently taken to the front.
It is understandable when the obsolete 100-mm Rapira smoothbore guns were assigned to support the infantry. They are not very relevant against modern tanks, so can be used to “finish off” the resource of barrels with high-explosive fragmentation shells before decommissioning. But to ruin our tanks … For what? In order, of course, to succumb to Ukropov’s wiring.
This duping is straightforward. Since the Armed Forces of Ukraine don’t give a shit about the fate of civilians in Doncek, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are hitting the city with multiple rocket launchers. All the preparations for firing can be done in advance, the BM-21 installation eventually rolls out to the point literally for a couple of minutes, the actual package of 40 missiles leaves the rails in less than a minute, after which a minute later the installation can be turned into a cargo Ural with the simplest means of camouflage, which from the air is not particularly distinguishable from the real cargo “Ural”. Moreover, with minimal extra work, the 40-barrel package of BM-21 launch tubes can be disassembled into blocks of 20 or even 10 guides and mounted on more compact machines that are easier to mask. In the end, a “counter-battery fire” against such missile terror by searching for and destroying systems with our current resources will give almost nothing. And that’s exactly what the enemy is counting on. He is counting on the fact that politicians, having seen enough of burning city blocks, will put pressure on the military – “Drive the ukrops away from the city!” And the 1st Armed Corps will continue to kill the remnants of their infantry at the Ukrainian fortified areas around Donetsk.
In other sectors of the front, the Russian command does not need such a goading, as it voluntarily drives to slaughter the last remnants of the infantry, no longer very combat-ready due to previous losses. The Russian military has an incredible talent for turning any village with a couple of landings and a pig farm into Verdun, on which their own, not enemy, units are ground. Why? Yes, because “BUSV”, the Combat Charter of the Ground Forces, these people do not open and read almost ever. And more than any “Javelins” and “HIMARS”, more than any “NATO satellite groups” fighting against us is the Combat Charter of our own Ground Forces, on which our valiant command wanted to shit. And ukrops [Ukrainians] – they read it and creatively processed it, taking into account the available new technologies.
In the text about radio communications, I described the main problem of command and control in the Russian army, due to which the army cannot really advance, cannot maneuver, and cannot even fully repel enemy attacks. Nothing larger than the “remnants of a motorized rifle battalion” in the RF Armed Forces can be controlled as a single organism. And, of course, in this situation, the battalion commanders and company commanders of these “remnants” become well-deserved heroes, who, if possible, drag all the shit on their own backs. Although more often, alas, they don’t. And they are buried with their subordinates when, after half a dozen assaults, each organized worse than the previous one, we still capture another piece of land and collect their rotten remains.
From the fact that the Russian army can do nothing except for, bleeding, capture another village while surrendering a district center or an entire region on the other flank, the Russian army made an amazing conclusion – let’s take more villages! And arranged the maximum possible Verduns along the entire front line, including the very infamous Pavlovka in the DPR. And, of course, Bakhmut. How could it be without it? Why not kill the last remnants of combat-ready infantry at it? It’s not possible at all. These fucking bastards need to get positive motives for the news somewhere! Here, we freed another 100 meters of such and such village. And whoever is the first to report on the complete liberation of the village gets an order.
I think that the Ukrainian command later, already in captivity, will give these people the appropriate awards. Because on the eve of the winter offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, it is almost impossible to provide the Armed Forces of Ukraine with some more significant service than killing the remnants of our infantry and the remnants of our tanks. Although no, I’m sorry. We can! It was provided to the hohols by the organizers of mobilization in the Russian Federation, who drove the lion’s share of those mobilized into “rifle regiments” without heavy weapons and artillery, the same state as the regiments of the Donbass “mobiks”. These absolutely uncontrollable due to the lack of proper command personnel and, of course, the lack of communications, units are simply created in order to devour the human resource and do not represent any combat value. They are simply created for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to locate them by the clusters of constantly turned-on cell phones, listen to their analog “Baofengs” radios and strike precisely at them, inflicting strikes in the flanks and rears of their neighbors – the battered during 10 months of the war formations of the regular troops of the Russian Federation and the Republics.
Could these people replenish the staffed personnel units, in which motivated officers and sergeants, military equipment remained? They could. It was possible to eliminate that monstrous patchwork that is the RF Armed Forces, when soldiers of various military units, the National Guard, PMCs, BARS volunteers”, “Akhmads” crowd on the square of one or two kilometers? It could be. But no one did it. The enemy has been rendered a large-scale service, worthy of a military tribunal, which, of course, will not happen.
Is it worth discussing the construction of the “Faberge Line” [Surovikin’s Line]? With shameful videos of how the T-64, at a very low speed, “God forbid the tank is scratched” is trying to “overcome the concrete gouges” and it is almost like a tetrahedron stops it. I can tell a lot of sad things about this “construction of the century” including 250-kg aerial bombs abandoned in forests, without any means for their remote detonation, marked on the maps as “land mines”, including concrete caps placed at the indicated points without any foundation and left after a couple of rains with embrasures below ground level, but this will be another huge text explaining why it is impossible to build fortification lines for people who, in principle, do not understand what, how and why they are doing it. I will reveal a terrible secret – the quality of this “Faberge Line” is purely secondary, because without all the other components of a properly built defense, even correctly, according to science, the built fortified areas can be assaulted without any problems.
It’s a shame to learn from the enemy of our army, yet in the meantime this spring and summer the enemy demonstrated in the Donbas all the necessary components of a successful long-term defense, which sipped a lot of blood of our troops. It suddenly turns out that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have problems with these issues, and all potential rudiments of improvements are destroyed at the root. I repeat once again – this level of military incompetence simply does not exist. This is deliberate sabotage, sabotage and betrayal.
The first and main condition for any successful defense is the presence of stable command and control. The Armed Forces of Ukraine ensured this to the maximum, transferring the entire army to closed digital communications and spreading a huge number of repeaters along the front line. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation do not want to solve their problems with communication. They don’t even want to voice them, because voicing leads to broken careers, confiscation of stolen goods, and prison sentences. All they can offer the troops, who now need to dig into the ground, is wired communication, for which the troops themselves must find both cable and field telephones (there is no discussion of field switches). And, of course, these field lines are being laid… in full accordance with the guidelines for laying temporary field lines. Somewhere just across the field, elsewhere along the trees, elsewhere along the poles. TEMPORARY FUCKING LINES! In the projects of the cyclopean “Faberge Line,” there is no place for normal underground cable communications protected from shelling! Having all the equipment, the materials, the time, all the infantry in positions will still remain without wire communication after five minutes of shelling. Exactly as it was with the Red Army in the summer of 1942 in the breakthrough sector during Operation Blau. But that is only, of course, if the infantry at all manages to find a field cable on its own in order to lay this connection at least somehow, And spare parts for field telephones are sent to the army by volunteers, bought up at flea markets.
In general, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation do not and will not have normal control. In the best case, units of the RF Armed Forces will be able, once in the LPR, to find the owner of this Planet Earth Control Panel and come to him with the words “Help us, Obi-Wan Kenobi!” and a bottle of cognac. And he will help, because a crowd of volunteers works for him, dragging him the necessary consumables at the expense of KCPN and OPSB [volunteer organisations].
The next item is artillery. Normal defence is built on artillery and around artillery. If there is artillery called from the front line in real time, then there is defense. No artillery – no defense. Rifle infantry will not hold the defense for a long time. The Armed Forces of Ukraine mastered their artillery for 7 years, the Russian army relaxed its artillery as best it could, filling the paths with gravel on the firing ranges and kicking the “stupid Donbasians” for not doing this. And, of course, stopping any attempts to automate the work of artillery with the help of appropriate software. “Not allowed”. We see the result. Monstrous lunar landscapes in the fields, where there is not a trace of Ukrainian fortifications. Echelons of ammunition flew away to nowhere under the approving bleat of propagandists and “experts” like Shurygin. And in the end, artillery depots near Izyum, handed over to the enemy. Well done!
The result at the moment (which the Russian media and biased bloggers are diligently trying to cover up with stories about how the fucking positions are taken out by 57-mm anti-aircraft guns and how cool it is to burn through the life of tank barrels with constant firing from closed positions) is a monstrous shell hunger in artillery. Air strikes from afar with unguided 80-mm rockets from a pitch-up (because if you fly closer, they will shoot you down) are also something only tickles a well-entrenched enemy, although it can look very impressive. Pew pew pew! Hooray! What a shot! And when the smoke settled – another plowed field. And the remnants of cannon artillery shells are spent, of course, on these same mini-Verduns throughout the contact line, which the Russian army diligently breeds one after another, grinding down infantry at them. Did the artillery gain radically more “eyes” in the air after 10 months? No. Did the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation bring the artillerymen enough autumn and winter camouflage nets for their guns? No. And winter is ahead. It will no longer be possible to hide the guns in the forests – the forests are bare, and then more snow will fall and in general, every step will be visible from the air. And the enemy with the UAV is doing well. Even considering losses. On our side, the stupid morons who wasted the ammo on plowing the fields decided to replace the six-inch projectiles with VOGs [greandes] dropped from copters. With the motivation “Well, hohols do it!”
But you fucking can’t. Because the hands are coming from the ass, and the ass is instead of the head.
Because hohols have learned over the years how to properly terrorize our motherfuckers with these grenade drops. They have tactics, they have a system for applying it. Starting with a competent choice of a site that is optimal for dumping terror, identifying convenient targets and ending with a concentration of forces – when 4-6 copters arrange a “carousel” over some unit for several hours, bombarding it with these VOGs or makeshift bombs. And you fuckers just order the “Mavics”, for which the people have scraped together the money, hoping that they will conduct reconnaissance and adjust artillery. No, let’s bomb. Immediately! Tomorrow! And people run to carry out your fucking order, headlong, without really working out either tactics or reconnaissance of targets. And they are trying to intimidate the army of moles with 30-mm little shits dropped from copters. And hohols jam these “Mavics” and shoot them down for their own pleasure, because they are NOT RETARDS, THEY ARE LEARNING. And the artillery remains not only with meager ammo but also without eyes.
It’s awesome. It’s magical. The faggot, who gave this order in the fall to the 1st Army Corps to “immediately bomb all ukrs with VOGs from drones,” must be attached to an attack aircraft and fucking dumped on ukrops. With a pitch. With a video and photo report.
Military minds fucking incapable of anything except for a “let’s do it like ukrops” cargo cult. Those who do not think that what works great during hunting for lazy carefree idiots will not work in the opposite direction, especially when executed crookedly and hastily.
In short, we figured out the artillery, it is also complete shit. Next item.
The next item is the infantry filling of the defense and, most importantly, the trained reserves. Without sufficient infantry reinforcements, without the necessary density of troops, without the possibility of bringing prepared reserves into battle in threatened areas, no line of fortifications, even the most perfect, will be held. This is very clearly shown, for example, by the events of the summer of 1941 on the Eastern Front. Minefields and any other barriers should be under constant supervision of the infantry and, as a result, under constant fire control. Otherwise, they will be overcome not even in hours, but in minutes. And in those places where the enemy considers it unnecessary to overcome them, they will interfere with your own counterattacks, because the enemy will provide fire control over them.
By grinding down the remnants of the infantry in mini-Verduns along the entire front, the Russian command renders an invaluable service to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which in the spring and summer showed how important it is to have a reserve of at least somewhat prepared infantry, which can fill more and more hastily built lines instead of those taken by our troops. We will not have such a supply of people for the winter offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. On average, our infantry is prepared disgustingly, without even touching on tactical issues. Shooting training is a complete ass and is difficult to fix because there are neither people capable of using the tools for reconciling shooting and training people, nor the tools themselves. Almost no one knows how to use group weapons normally.
And this has a very simple explanation – the constant loss of experienced people in the spring and summer, plus all the fucks that the RF Armed Forces did not give about normal training of those mobilized both in the Republics and in the Russian Federation. The hope that a grenade launcher, who is taught to hit with an old-style RPG-7 grenade a fixed frontal projection of a tank from 300 meters, will be able to knock out a tank in a real battle – that’s great. Same as like shooting from 100 meters at a chest target in conditions when the enemy tries not to show you where the “chest target” is. But what does all this “preparation”, including trampling across the field in dense groups, have to do with real combat conditions? None.
Here I will not sneer and rhetorically ask what percentage of our infantry is trained to use positions for oblique (flanking) fire. The answer is pretty obvious. In conditions when entire regiments of “mobiks” do not have fully prepared ATGM crews and the enemy will be able to adjust armored vehicles for direct fire and destroy any pillboxes and bunkers in a matter of minutes, it is precisely such positions that will be of key importance. But they will not be equipped, they will not be used, and the Ukrainian offensive will again go through like a knife through butter. And the time will come for what? Correctly. For checking whether we have prepared armored and mechanized units in reserve, large enough to successfully hit under the base of deep enemy penetrations into our defenses. This is the fourth component of a successful long-term defense. And we won’t have it either.
Not only are tanks now burning their barrel resource, replacing artillery in mini-Verduns, “bald” tanks are massively supplied to the troops from storage, on which there is not even an old model of dynamic protection, and tankmen, through volunteers, are feverishly looking for money to ensure that containers for dynamic protection are welded onto tanks in artisanal conditions. That is, if in February-March of this year the question was “Why the hell did our tanks again go into battle with empty dynamic protection containers, like in Grozny in 1995?”, then now the question will be why our tanks are “bald” at all, almost completely helpless against any enemy anti-tank weapons, starting with the oldest Soviet rounds for RPG-7. This is awesome progress. The factories are “modernizing the T-62”, and the newer T-72 and T-80 are brought “bald” for slaughter. Bravissimo.
And most of the new types of vehicles were safely screwed up during the spring “de-escalation” and replenished the repair funds of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as the abandoned SPAMs of the 1st Guards Tank Army in the Izyum direction. This, of course, was a masterpiece moment, when the remnants of the 3rd Motor Rifle Division and a piece of 144th Reconnaissance are fighting with all their might, hoping that behind them the whole guards tank army is about to turn around and kick the Ukrainians, but they turn around and there is NO army. Awesome. This is exactly what I’m talking about – not just flags on the map, but “prepared” and “combat-ready” armored reserves. We will not have them either by the beginning of the Ukrainian winter offensive. At all. There will be nothing to parry blows. Conditions have been created and strictly controlled under which such reserves simply cannot emerge. And if something is scraped together and thrown into the attack, it turns out that the adversary can perfectly track the visual of our armored vehicles by monitoring the operation of the obsolete radio stations R-123 and R-173 on the tanks. But we can’t track the movements of their armor like that – they all have the same type of radio equipment, they operate in the same frequencies, and the base radio stations on tanks can do everything to reduce power to the level of a portable station. In our country, only in some places, through volunteer efforts, it was possible to give the troops at least some convenient portable radios in the R-123/173/159 frequencies, and the transfer of armored vehicles to the modern “digits” was limited to one battalion for all “allied forces”, so it remained. Again, purely thanks to enthusiasts and volunteers.
In general, with regard to military high-tech innovations, over the past 10 months, our military-industrial complex has demonstrated its complete incompetence, which is covered up by bias and complete incompetence of “military experts”. And this concerns not only the Dobrynya drone, which is absolutely useless for use at the front, because it is remade from cheap Chinese racing drones with Ali Express. Like I laughed at the phrase of another expert who said about radio warfare system “Borschevik”: “The complex can be installed on a car chassis, which makes it convenient to use it on the front line” … damn … Well, this really is “black is white.” Only a moron now does not see that portable systems are needed. In the zone where the operation of such a system will give at least some decent result, a parked truck with another unparalleled complex will be detected and destroyed by the enemy in a moment. Fucking convenient. And this despite the fact that all this, all this was obvious back in the years of the “Minsk agreements”, but everyone was fucking around. Tank biathlons and jokes about Rogozin’s trampolines gave positive feedback. But reality did not give it.
Outcome? A fucking hell waiting for us ahead in the winter. There will be no significant chances to hold the current front, and the enemy is well aware of this, concentrating his forces where it is convenient and valuable for him. There is no progress on any of the points that determine the success of the defense, only regression that is systematically encouraged.
And the fucking thing will become especially obvious when the snow falls and the whole movement, including all our artillery, will be in full view of the enemy UAVs, and Grubnik [another volunteer] with his “People’s Network” will stupidly not be enough for the WHOLE ARMY to compensate for the lack of winter camouflage nets.
And everyone is silent about this again. And when the cities and regions will be again surrendered everyone will be like, “Ah, how did this happen!?!? Ahh, we were so hoping for Surovikin! He is so brutal! Why he couldn’t?!?!” And Surovikin himself will be in awe because even if you are really fucking motivated, the most important field marshal, you are powerless to do anything if you have an army of fuckers in your subordination, in which the gaps of enlightenment start somewhere at the level of lieutenant colonels and go down, not up.
I’ll repeat it again to better understand, damn it.
This level of military incompetence simply does not exist. There is a huge, massive betrayal, and systematic preparation for a completely hellish massacre during the next Ukrainian offensive. The Russian army, and its command leave no chance of success.
And the faggots among the “experts” and military correspondents who cover and glorify all this, sucking the “positive” out of this, bear their share of responsibility for all the future fuck-ups.
And yes, I’m sad in a separate way that this fucking process of praising the mini-Verduns of this autumn-winter, in which our last chances of successfully repelling the Ukrainian offensive are being burned, has even affected Anya Dolgareva, who made up fucking news piece about two kilometers of allegedly captured buildings in the Spirne, although the entire Spirne is barely one kilometer in diameter. And it’s all under Ukrop control, damn it! Now explain to me what kind of a vile atmosphere of “focus on the positive” needs to be created in the community so that one of the most objective military correspondents would give a fuck about fact-checking? I’m in awe. I’m in complete fucking awe. And I’m not whining or complaining now. When the hohols break through the front, I will get my machine gun, put on my armor and go and try to kill someone before I die. And they will kill me, and I, damn it, will not see all the further shame, therefore we can say that I will be fine. Almost awesome. And you all will live in this fucked up place. And you will all be asking each other when Russia is “decolonized”, – “But how did it happen? How did it happen?!?”
This is how. This is how. They closed their eyes, they closed them, they wanted positive news, have them, damn it. You jerked off at a “Saint 1913”? Well, get it, and then 1916 and 1917. WE SAID ABOUT IT 100 TIMES.
The imperial guard, which could easily crush the February rebellion, was buried in the swamps of Stokhod not by “damned Bolshevik agitators”, but by tsarist generals.
If this winter we manage to keep something somewhere, and the probability of this still remains, then this will be possible only contrary to the command of the RF Armed Forces. Crowds of volunteers are now working to maximize the chances of this. Winning the war as a whole “in spite of” is a very non-trivial task, much more difficult than constantly obtaining regular delays at the terrible cost of a lot of blood of the peasants at the front. Fuck knows how to solve it, I haven’t figured it out yet.