Once again the internationally recognised (unlike Crimea) war criminal Igor Girkin shares his view summarising the situation on the frontlines in Ukraine, mainly in Donbas, as of 1 June 2022. The Russian offensive in Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area where the invader concentrated the full force of their strike is fading without fresh reserves. Fierce battles for Lysychansk are expected in the nearest future after Severodonetsk is cleared of the Ukrainian forces. Attempts to cross Siverskyi Donets are likely. No major changes in other areas, except for Kherson where Ukrainian advance has been stopped due to Russian air superiority – the risk of a repeated offensive cannot be ruled out.
Full translation is below:
In short, about the situation on the frontline.
Kharkiv – the frontline has stabilised at a slight distance from and along the RF border. Positional fights.
South of Izyum – no changes.
Krasnyi Lyman – the operation has mostly concluded, remnants of the defeated enemy units are leaving the eastern bank of Siverskyi Donetsk, our forces are clearing the adjacent forests. Could also note that it was not possible to cross the river “on the enemy’s shoulders”, and most likely the frontline will stabilise along this line the same way as upstream and downstream.
Severodonetsk. The enemy, snarling, is gradually leaving the city due to limited ability to support the garrison via destroyed bridges, which are under continuous artillery and aviation strikes of RF AF. I presume the clearing of the industrial zone of the city will last another day or two, unlikely more (unless UAF will not throw in another large unit to be slaughtered).
Lysychansk-Zolotoye area. Fierce fights with a very slow advance on RF AF and DPR AF (in addition to PMCs). The enemy continues fierce resistance in the “bag” hoping for it to be unblocked. Most likely, by deploying reserves the UAF managed to clear the Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway pushing out our forces, however the highway is under continuous shelling and supplying the enemy group through it is difficult. It can be stated with a high degree of certainty that the outcome and timing of the conclusion of liberation of Lysychansk depend specifically on whether the Russian forces will be able to cut off these supply lines. In any case, this is extremely important since the advancing forces themselves are in a “pocket” with not that wide of a neck, so until Zolotoye is taken – the danger for rears and flanks will remain.
On the Bakhmut-Soledar line – no significant changes, local hostilities continue, the new frontline is forming.
In Avdeevka area – no significant changes: fights to improve the positions *of Russian forces*, fierce artillery skirmishes.
Maryinka area and to the South towards Uhledar – no significant changes, positional fights.
Zaporizhye frontline – no changes.
Kherson frontline – I believe that attacks of UAF in Davydov Brod area were quite large-scale, but still only “reconnaissance by force”. UAF suffered substantial losses, however the amount of manpower and equipment brought into the battle does not allow us to speak about a disruption of the offensive. During the attacks, the enemy has had certain advance but did not achieve breakthrough of the frontline.
Donetsk, Makeevka, Horlivka – yesterday were again under heavy artillery shelling. I do not rule out that in the coming days the shelling can become truly massive.
General conclusion: the advance of the Russian troops in Donbas is fading, and without deployment of fresh reserves will not lead to the defeat of the enemy. At the moment, the most important question for the Russian command is the capture of Lysychansk, which will consolidate the successes in Popasna by liquidating the dangerous bulge of the UAF strongpoint in Lysychansk-Zolotoye area. Most likely, in the coming week the main efforts of our forces will be directed at completing this task, and I’m not expecting any major operation until this is done.
RF AF and DPR AF are in dire need of combined-arms reserves to develop the achieved successes. In this regard, the hostilities taking place in the fortified in advance and saturated with enemy forces positions are characterised as “gnawing” through the defences, inevitably leading to heavy losses for both sides without major successes for the attacker.
As of 1 June the UAF group in Donbas is NOT defeated although it took significant losses and was forced to abandoned a number of important localities (in a month: Popasna, Svetlodarsk, Krasnyi Lyman, Severodonetsk) and in places retreat to the second line of defence.
Predictions of the next 7-10 days:
Russian forces will be forced to continue attacking Lysychansk, trying to defeat or at least push out the defending group of UAF and capture the city. New attempts to cross Siverskyi Donets are possible (I hope that if they happen, they will not be failures like all before them). UAF will continue defending in this area.
At other parts of the Donetsk frontline the offensive battles will presumably be of a tactical nature, except for perhaps Avdeevka where a promising offensive (to the north) was stopped in favour of transferring forces to Severodonetsk-Lysychansk direction.
UAF actions: The enemy is likely to continue “finding weak points” in RF AF defence in Kherson and (possibly) Zaporizhye directions. At the same time, while having sufficient ground forces for a limited offensive, UAF do not have substantial air support and medium-range air defence capable of covering the battlefield from strikes by Russian aviation further than the first line of our defence. Therefore with a timely discovery by our reconnaissance of the accumulation of strike forces of the enemy – it will undoubtedly be possible to stop their efforts. At the same time, the danger of a frontline breakthrough in case of an unexpected strike should not be ruled out. The UAF are learning to fight quickly and the foreign advisors are managing them quite well.
