Igor Girkin who has remained relatively quiet in the past couple of weeks after his debacle and an alleged attempt to enter Ukraine through Crimea, comes back with a long-winded post on his Telegram channel, once again throwing shade at the Russian Minister of Defence who is claimed to be “pushing for mobilisation in Russia while the president is firmly against it”.
In the post, Girkin first goes over the results of the third “Effective” stage of the SMO, claiming that it has now slowly became the fourth “preserve the civilian population of Ukraine” stage:
In the last couple of weeks, a topic has emerged on the Internet that is becoming more widespread, it has a nominal name: “Shoygu is not to blame for anything, he is doing all his best to win the war (insisting on holding the necessary mobilisation measures for this), but Putin personally interferes with him.” Apparently – this topic is being heavily thrown in and pushed through. And it is especially receiving a push right now, when Ramzan Akhmadovich [Kadyrov] reiterated his readiness to “quickly take Kyiv at any moment, if there is such an opportunity” (quoting closely, not exactly).
Since my deepest sympathies for the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation (sometimes reaching enthusiastic admiration) are widely known, and for half a year I have been restrained from even more hysterical reverence for the president by the firmly observed promise “not until the war is over,” I consider myself entitled to try and act as an “arbitrator” (don’t take it as impudence!) in this (to use the words of respected Vitaly “Afrika”) “dance of shadows on the ashes”, which the anonymous force behind the above “stuffing” is trying to present to us.
So, very briefly about the current military situation:
1. The third (“Effective” – R.A. Kadyrov) stage of the SMO, in just three weeks since its start smoothly became the 4th (“saving the civilian population by slowing down the pace of the operation” – by S.K. Shoigu personally);
2. In fact, all the “effectiveness” of the 3rd stage ended with insignificant (but costly) tactical advances near Donetsk, culminating in the capture of the Peski urban settlement. On the Kherson front, there was an “exchange” – ours advanced 5 km to Mykolaiv from Snigirevka, ukrs captured two villages and a bridgehead on the Inuglets River between Snigirevka and Davydov Brod. On other fronts also, in general, the frontline has not changed.
3. During the summer, the enemy sharply (by many times) increased the number of missile and unmanned strikes against the deep and close rear areas of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Armed Forces of the LDPR, achieving new successes, now quite comparable (in terms of damage) with missile strikes on their own territory received from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from the beginning of the SMO. Thus, in this respect, the RF Armed Forces have lost “exclusive superiority”, while the Armed Forces of Ukraine have achieved a certain parity. Sad but true.
Concluding on the result of these stages Girkin believes that Russian Federation has lost the initiative and failed to reach the stated goals of the third stage, which in fact has lead to Ukraine strengthening its position in the war despite issues with replenishment of troops. He then moves on to pronounce how the narrative of Shoygu being capable of producing any results and mobilising the country are completely false:
Based on this, it can be concluded that within the framework of the SMO, the Russian command not only failed to achieve the defeat of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but even the complete displacement of the enemy forces from the territory of the DPR using available forces fell into the category of “hopeful dreams.” It is clear that new offensive attempts will be made and may even lead to new tactical successes, but on the whole, a balance has developed on the frontline. And the “scales” on the part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are now very slowly but steadily outweighing the Russian.
Both sides are experiencing problems with the replenishment of troops and their growing demotivation, however, in the context of the overall numerical superiority of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, this problem is less critical for them than for the RF Armed Forces.
Another thing is that the Russian Federation, indeed, has not yet decided to fight at full strength and has not even tried to carry out limited mobilisation measures at the front and in the rear, which (only in theory and of course far from immediately) can sharply incline the “scales” in our direction.
And now we return to our beloved minister’s allegedly acute urge to “achieve this very mobilisation” and his “attempts” to convince the “unyielding supreme leader” to announce it.
So, I think this version is a complete and absolute lie. At least even looking at what activities the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is taking right now to replenish troops without mobilisation. And right now, instead of replenishing the extremely tired and already seasoned (that is, those who have learned to fight in the current difficult conditions) front-line units (which could dramatically increase their morale and combat effectiveness in general), Mr. Shoygu’s department is feverishly forming in all regions of the Russian Federation the “volunteer named battalions”, which, once they get to the front, will inevitably be if not defeated in the very first battles (just like now our troops are beating units of the “territorial defense”), then they will inevitably suffer huge unjustified losses – simply due to the general “dampness” and inexperience of the personnel. And it is not a fact that after these “cruel lessons” and huge losses the “named volunteers” will not start to running much faster than the fighters of PMCs and line contract units are doing now.
Thus, we are talking about either the same “advanced cretinism”, or about … the sabotage I have repeatedly mentioned. (I agree to the presence and “symbiosis” of both of these motives).
But, let’s say, we are talking simply about progressive idiocy and the desire of the thoroughly ineffective army elite to “just create as many colonel and general command / staff positions as possible.” Let it be.
But after all, in the event of mobilisation, our Russian society will face a logical question: “But how is that!? We were defeating everyone for six months! And suddenly mobilisation is required? Konashenkov has been lying to us all this time?!?!” To this question – like it or not, something will need to be answered. And “organisational conclusions” must be made. And who will be the first candidate for “organisational conclusions”? What do you think? Konashenkov? Hardly!
Or, perhaps, do you think that Vladimir Vladimirovich himself will appear on TV and ask “to be treated with understanding”, taking the blame on himself? I highly doubt it.
Girkin continues his criticism of Shoygu once again bringing up the argument that any decent general would have already resigned after failing to achieve their stated goals:
Sergei Kuzhugetovich will certainly become the first and main candidate “to fly out”. “By the totality of merit”, so to speak … He will be remembered everything, all the “2000 drones”, and “unparalleled” tanks / aircraft / missiles (in numbers that can be counted on the fingers), and an amazing selection of leading military personnel, and general supply of troops, etc., etc.
Does our wonderful minister want such an ending? I doubt. Therefore, I’m practically sure that he will “pull the cat by the tail” to the end, reporting to the president that “just a little more, just a little more – and the enemy will break down and sue for peace! be patient a little!” And – since our president is most of all inclined to “do nothing and wait until something happens…” – then such assurances fall on fertile ground. Well, I think so….
And, yes, if you imagine for a moment that Sergei Kuzhugetovich really “like a lion is fighting for the national-state interests of Russia” and daily reports to the president the full truth about what is happening at the front, supplementing it with the words: “I strongly beg you to immediately mobilise, until it’s not too late!” – then why he did not resign, offering it as the most serious and obvious argument, not wanting to take responsibility for the impending disaster? (I remind you that in my eyes, the protracted war in the so-called Ukraine “was and will be a catastrophe that can lead to the collapse of the Russian Federation, which I wrote about many times for many years in a row).
But right after his resignation – Sergei Kuzhugetovich, as a seasoned experienced politician (well, he’s not a military man, really?) – could (“dressed in all white”) go to the media platform and mournfully declare: “I did everything I could, but since it was not possible to convince Vladimir Vladimirovich to mobilise and introduce martial law – I wash my hands of it!”
But Sergei Kuzhugetovich will never do this. Since the word “Honour” for him is nothing more than an abstract concept, but “Authority” is an utterly understandable and quite tangible thing. And for the sake of some kind of “honour” he would not even think of sacrificing authority, while to “playing an honest man” in any way convincingly, there’s not enough brains for that.
It appears as if Girkin’s scare has gone away and we are going to see more of his posts in the near future.