Igor Girkin – overview of the Ukraine frontlines as of 27 June.

Posted on 27 June 2022

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Igor Girkin publishes his view of the Ukraine frontline situation in the morning of 27 June. The source is available on Igor’s Telegram channel:

Short overview of the frontline situation:

1. The “border” frontline (from Belarus border to Kharkiv Oblast).

Both sides, suspecting the enemy of the ability to strike an insidious unexpected blow (whether justified or not – I don’t know), are gradually accumulating strength, trying to cover the border. The former “respected Kyiv partners” are doing it somewhat better – they have more human resources. In this regard, they are also taking the initiative by shelling Russian military and civilian objects on our *Russian* side of the border, also sending in sabotage groups, which resulted in two (that have been widely known) destructions of smaller units of border guards (6 and 4 killed, in both cases without punishment).

Likely, both sides are not yet ready to create the continuous active frontline in this extended section due to a lack of resources. Which does not at all exclude an attack of one of the sides for tactical or propaganda objectives.

2. Kharkiv frontline

In the north and central sections, fights of local significance continue. Russian forces most likely have no power to develop the offensive, or any desire to continue developing it. The “partners” have the desire but don’t have the heavy weaponry. Russian forces, after moving forward, created a “safe zone” covering the adjacent regions of RF from shelling, and capable of acting as a foothold for the future offensive on Kharkiv.

In the southern section (Balakleya area) for the whole of past week the UAF were attempting to endanger the Izyum grouping of RF AF with a flank strike. It did not progress further than the fights of local significance.

3. Sloviansk direction

Along the entire frontline south of Izyum (from Velikaya Kamyshevakha to Siverskyi Donets) there are local fights, artillery skirmishes and activities of reconnaissance and sabotage groups. RF AF did not conduct offensive actions in the classical sense, concentrating their efforts on attempts to “finish off” the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk agglomeration, although attempts to “try out” enemy’s positions and attempts of tactical moves continue. UAF while counter-attacking insignificantly in places, are continuing to fortify using their main forces at the approaches towards Sloviansk-Kramatorsk fortresses and along the Sloviansk-Barvenkovo line, counting on fighting here a decisive defensive battle if the RF AF command decided to assault this reinforced area directly.

4. Severodonetsk – Lysychansk agglomeration

Throughout the week along the whole frontline fierce battles continued with large losses for both sides (on our side the lion’s share again fell on LPR People’s Militia). The enemy managed to withdraw remnants of their troops from the foothold on the left bank of Siverskyi Donets (south of Severodonetsk) by abandoning the largest part of heavy weaponry and suffering significant losses in manpower. However, the defending UAF units and mercenary detachments avoided the total defeat and destruction. Similar situation occurred in Gorskoye-Zolotoye fortress – despite large losses the enemy managed to withdraw the core of the garrison from the operational encirclement, abandoning in the “cauldron” only small and forgotten detachments and groups of demoralised deserters. Very few P.O.W.s were taken. It can be said that our “pincers grabbed empty air”. Yet still, the dangerous bulge in the rear of the advancing to the west of Popasna group is now cut off, and the integrity of the UAF frontline in south and south-east outskirts of Lysychansk has been compromised. LDPR AF and RF AF reached directly the southern outskirts of Lysychansk, and to the west – nearly took it into operational encirclement, which, however, as of last night has not yet been completed. I assume the possibility of a gradual (certainly with battles) retreat of UAF garrison towards Seversk, and the conclusion of fights for this area within a week (unless UAF bring in large fresh reserves).

5. Seversk-Bahkmut-Soledar frontline

No substantial changes. The second line of long-terms defensive constructions runs here, built by UAF during “alternative-less Minsk agreements”. All said cities have additional concentric defensive contours. In Bakhmut and Soledar there are Soviet-built military bases (in fact, in Soledar – an underground and fortified storage base). The assault on the second line occupied by plentiful forces of the enemy will not be successful without engaging all RF AF and LDPR RF forces, and I’m not predicting it for the nearest future (unless of course the Russian command decides otherwise, contrary to common sense).

6. Donetsk frontline

Wedging into the UAF’s first line of defence at Avdeevka did not see further development for the same reason, which is an acute lack of necessary combat-ready units and the same acute lack of manpower in available units. On the frontline from Horlivka/Toretsk to Maryinka there are positional fights, active UAVs and enemy snipers, and exhausting shelling (more often than not alternate; for instance, yesterday they were shelling Horlivka) of military objects, life-support facilities and simply residential areas of the frontline towns by UAF artillery.

7. South Donetsk frontline.

Over several days the enemy managed to push our forces south of Uhledar, knocking back the “secondary” detachments of “mobilised” by 2-3 kilometers (more in places) and moving the frontline to Pavlivka and Ehorivka villages. Their blow clearly had limited and distracting nature with aim to weaken the pressure of the strike group of RF AF and LDPR AF on Lysychansk. Despite this, it demonstrated the relative weakness of our frontline on this quite important direction.

8. Zaporizhye and Kherson frontlines.

In general – no changes. Notable is the generally increasing enemy activity, especially their artillery and sabotage groups.

General conclusions:

1) The protracted battle of the “Second (Concrete) Stage of the SMO” is gradually ending. Whether it will end with an operational pause, or will immediately move into the “Battle for the initiative” (“the effective stage” announced by Kadyrov) – I won’t be guessing, but I still expect that this battle will start outside of Donbas. The current battle is ending with tactical successes of RF AF, but strategically, in general it is unsuccessful since by the 5th month of SMO the group of UAF in Donbas is still not defeated, likewise it was not pushed out of the majority of its positions.

2) The defeat of UAF in the battle for Severodonetsk on one hand, and the failure of the strategic operation to liberate Donbas by RF AF on the other has already lead to the further increase of military supplies for UAF from the “dear western partners” (not mine). In July-August a lot will be decided after deployment of reserves from both sides. The time is working both against the so-called “Ukraine” and the RF. But against the RF, the time is working harder. Especially considering how the Russian political authorities seduced by local (and very expensive) successes are critically slowly realising the necessity of putting the country’s economy onto “war rails”.




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