Igor Girkin draws parallels between war in Ukraine and the Russo-Japanese war

Posted on 07 June 2022



Igor Girkin draws parallels between war in Ukraine and the Russo-Japanese war and states that Russia is facing inevitable mutiny if it doesn’t escalate into a fully-fledged war. Translated from a Telegram post from 7 June 2022:


Going back to the war. Upon arriving to the theatre of operations and facing (expectedly, by the way) a significant superiority of the Japanese forces in the Manchurian theatre of operations, Kuropatkin (Aleksey Kuropatkin, Russian Imperial Minister of War, and later Field Commander) began implementing his long-term (it was approved annually since 1901) plan of a gradual retreat while conducting rearguard battles, with only one objective – to prevent the army from being encircled and defeated until it can go on an equal footing (it was not about the formal numbers, but rather supplies – the Russian armies experienced a serious shortage of EVERYTHING at the time) to resist the Japanese. Thus, he was retreating with battles (Liaoyang, Shaho, and a few more). However, Petersburg (“the society”) did not want to know anything about the superiority of “macaques” in numbers and weaponry. They demanded victories, and fast victories. The result is well known: at the sea – a horrific defeat at Tsushima, on land – a heavy (although not a complete) defeat at Mukden (which was quite possible to win – here the Russian numbers were higher than that of the Japanese, but the “human factor” played a role – Kuropatkin with his indecisiveness and emphasis on passive defence was unable to win or at least bring the battle to a draw). These completely unexpected defeats (from “savages”!) became the trigger for the revolution that began in the Empire. And in turn, the revolution prevented from winning the protracted war.


How did it look like? – This is how. After Tsushima and Mukden the Russian high command (i.e. Tsar, court, and Ministry of War) became smarter – carried out a mobilisation, started “emergency” construction of new railway lines, junctions and interchanges (and improved as much as possible the communication with the Far East, which at the start of the campaign did not just lack infrastructure for supplies, but was generally in a shoddy state). It urgently purchased from abroad as many machine guns as possible (although, at that time the Japanese army didn’t have that many either – roughly as many as we did in our army), significantly increased weapon, ammunition and equipment production. By the end of the war the Manchuria theatre of operations saw deployment of an army that was huge (for those places) and decently supplied with everything necessary, which stood against no more than 300,000 Japanese soldiers. But… it was too late – the economy was trembling, “the society” was raging, mutinies in the army and fleets have started – basically, the “revolution got going”. So Petersburg had to agree to a humiliating and forced peace agreement. All to the applause of the “Respected Western partners” (Japan had sympathisers and was directly assisted with weapons and loans by Great Britain, USA, France… only the German Empire was loyal to Russia – “Cousin Willy” saw an opportunity to break the Russo-French military alliance).


Why am I writing all of this? For the same reasons I spoke about before – the war in the so-called “ukraine” is painfully reminding me of the events of a hundred years ago. Moscow clearly was going to carry out a “small victorious colonial war”, deploying just the staff army without overburdening the economy. “The society” was expecting a “fast victory” (which Kremlin was shouting about from every corner in the first days of the operation). Three months have passed. Thank God, so far we haven’t had new Tsushimas or Mukdens (although the “run to the border” is a wonderful in its humiliating uselessness – it can hardly be called a “victory”). However, the Kremlin is stubbornly attempting to continue with the “colonial expedition”, without taking things seriously and fighting for real. While the enemy (which again is helped by the “respected Western partners” with all their might) is fighting more than seriously.


The internal political situation in the Russian Federation is also very similar to that of the eve of 1905. The authorities are frankly UNPOPULAR and are often despised in all socially active layers of the society. They only hold on thanks to bureaucracy – outrageously inefficient and thoroughly (disgustingly) corrupt. The Armed Forces are demonstrating the same depressing inefficiency, while its command – inability for adequate management (Shoygu and Gerasimov are as far from Kuropatkin in their professionalism as a petty wedding toastmaster from Bolshoi Theatre performer). In addition, instinctively feeling their own “anti-effectiveness” and unpopularity, the authorities are clearly afraid of conducting even the most necessary of the mobilisation measures – afraid of “shaking up the stability”. But when they do decide (the course of the war will inevitably force them to) – they will do it in the very last moment, when the “trust credit” from the society will be fully exhausted, while the deteriorating socio-economic situation of the population will be capable of provoking an explosion of anger…

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