Day 293, December 13, 2022. Summary of #Arestovych and #Feygin broadcast

Posted on 14 December 2022



Summary of the daily livestream with Aleksey Arestovych, kindly brought to you by Janat: @Janat_H1

🔥 Frontline Update

No significant changes on the frontline. RU focuses its efforts on the Maryinka-Bakhmut and Kreminna-Svatove directions. RU units of recruited inmates and the mobilized regularly attack UA positions. Change of tactics from RU army: attacks by small mobile groups of infantry; small units are easier to manage and motivate. Battalion attacks are long gone. 

A solution that is impossible in developed countries is the sanitary cleansing of the Russian Federation from its prisoners. By amassing the frontlines with tens of thousands of inmates, RU gains time to prepare its professional reserves. By January-February, Russia’s restored units will likely attempt to seize the initiative on the fronts. 

Related to this is the media hysteria about the “imminent” attack from Belarus, which began checks of combat readiness and whose special forces advanced toward the border. However, only 12 armored personnel carriers were spotted. This is just a diversion tactic, according to Arestovych, to tie up UA forces in the North and not transfer them to the East and South. 

🔥 Weapons

Pentagon found no cases of misuse of Western weapons supplied to UA. The issue is mostly raised out of the confrontation between Republicans and Democrats. Despite multiple accusations that the supplied weapons have been illegally sold, there’s been no proof. UA is open to inspection and takes military equipment accounting seriously. 

According to CNN, the US may transfer the Patriot air defense system to UA in the coming weeks. UA military will be trained on their use at a base in Germany. Arestovych views this measure as inevitable; the question is the delivery time. Patriots will significantly strengthen UA air defense and reduce the effectiveness of Russian attacks and massive raids. But UA also awaits the decision on the supply of offensive weapons to begin liberating its territory. 

🔥 Zaporizhye NPP

Zaporizhye NPP: an agreement is possible on the withdrawal of heavy weapons by the Russian army before the end of the year. The question is whether it will be previously imposed penalties or a postponement of future sanctions that is discussed with Moscow.

🔥 Hungary

According to Arestovych, Hungary’s blocking the introduction of the 9th package of anti-Russian sanctions is deeply immoral against the background of the genocide of Ukrainians and may result in the country’s withdrawal from the EU and NATO. The position of Hungary’s leadership is clear; they tried to torpedo aid to Ukraine, which ensures the survival of UA civilian population; Hungary blackmails EU to obtain preferences and plays complementary for Moscow, designated by NATO as its main threat. Hungary’s collaborative politics go against the EU and NATO efforts. 

🔥 Confiscation of Assets

The UK is considering a mechanism to use frozen Russian assets to rebuild Ukraine. UA’s victory and weakening of the Kremlin will allow the UK to regain its position as a superpower. They are now debating, discussing, and probing public opinion; this will take time, but when they reach a consensus and begin confiscating assets, other states will follow their lead. 

The process of alienating and seizing UA properties owned by the Russian State Duma deputies will also happen in Ukraine in due time.

🔥 Putin’s address canceled

Putin might not address the federal assembly or appear at the annual press conference. Arestovych expects no annual speeches by Putin in December: the dictator-terrorist has nothing to present to RU population at this point nor to offer any bright prospects and promises of RU’s retaliatory measures. Putin cannot report any encouraging figures; they all show downward trends. RU is waiting for any diplomatic and military achievements before Putin addresses the assembly and the public. 

Another reason for not making public addresses is his deteriorating physical state. Arestovych explained his comment from an interview with Dmitri Gordon during a stroll at a cemetery: it was not a forecast but an assumption that Putin might die in April 2023. They discussed the end of the war. Arestovych expects the active fighting to fade by mid-summer unless a “black swan” event (Putin’s death) takes place earlier, say in April. In that case, the war will end much sooner. 

🔥 RU planned offensive 

The Russian military-political command is trying to seize the initiative at the front. Arestovych expects them to begin in mid-December and attempt to gain territory by February, to present something to the population on the anniversary of the war. This offensive will be drawn-out, similar to what they did in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk and are doing in Bakhmut as they lack resources for a quick offensive. The plans are there but may not be realized. UA is not going to wait and watch. 

🔥 Partners’ Support

UA informs its partners of these developments, which will lead to more aid. G7 shows unwavering support to UA and states that Putin will be personally held accountable for the war.

No stream on Wednesday, December 14

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