Day 147, July 20. Summary of Arestovych and Feygin daily broadcast

Posted on 21 July 2022


by Atis

Summary of the daily livestream with Aleksey Arestovych, kindly brought to you by Atis:

English voice-over video by Privateer Station:

Original video in Russian:

Battlefield update:

Siversk-Bakhmut: 🇷🇺 lost 2 villages during their “offensive”.
Vuhledar: 🇺🇦 captured several more villages.
Zaporozhye: 🇷🇺 was bombing Nikopol for last 3-4 days across the Dnipro river, there are no military targets. 2 response hits on Enerhodar yesterday and today.

Kherson: Antonovsky bridge got hit again, many holes, unusable for heavy military equipment. 🇷🇺 reporter should get a medal in 🇺🇦, for documenting precise structural damage done. There is still rail bridge, and dam in Nova Khakovka – it can not be easily destroyed, but vehicles crossing it can be hit.
🇷🇺 radar at Lazurne destroyed, part of S-300/S-400 system, used for targeting small low flying aircraft (drones, etc). It is 3rd such radar destroyed, previous 2 at Chornobaivka.

Decrease of munition is visible. During Lysychansk offensive, strongest forces were located in Izium, but they had no progress, despite using a lot of artillery.

Last 24 hours 4 🇷🇺 warehouses hit, mostly in Kherson and Bakhmut directions. This forces 🇷🇺 to move warehouses some 60-70km behind front-line. At 60km truck can do 3 trips per day, army can do offensive, at 90km truck does 2 trips per day, inability to keep offensive tempo, at 120km there can be no offensive, only holding defence.

60% of 🇷🇺 forces are now located from Izium to Bakhmut, having advantage 4:1 to 6:1, but they are still losing some areas due to counter-attacks. 🇷🇺 are loosing last operational reserves of infantry and equipment. Situation won’t change tomorrow, but expecting inability to attack in 1-1.5 months. In other directions there is no 🇷🇺 offensive.

Updated information on air-defence hit near Nova Khakovka [couple of days ago] – destroyed radar, S-300 launcher and missile storage. As 🇺🇦 is starting to hit air-defence units, it means 🇷🇺 group on west-coast of Dnipro is becoming softer, 🇺🇦 is looking where to bite.

Ramstein meeting #4:

🇺🇸 SecDef Lloyd Austin mentioned “final phase”, meaning 🇷🇺 power is on plateau, even slowly decreasing. 1-1.5 months estimate also by Lloyd Austin.
4 more M142 HIMARS, total over 30 systems including M270.

🇺🇦 is winning counter-battery battles at brigade level, as it receives not only singular weapons, but whole systems – artillery, radars, recon. Ukraine has enough drones on all levels of the army.

🇷🇺 navy has moved back, behind Sevastopol. Russia better sink their Black Sea Fleet now since it’s useless.
🇺🇦 SoF landed at Snake Island, recovered documents and rescued a cat.

🇷🇺 lies

Lavrov said that 🇷🇺 plans expanding zone of operation, not only Luhansk and Donetsk districts. Putin lies about retreating from Kyiv as gesture of good will for negotiations. Yet the Istanbul meeting was on 27th [March], while retreat from Kyiv started at beginning of April.

Similarly Yanukovych did a meeting with Maidan movement on 21st [February 2014], negotiated staying president, and next elections. Meanwhile 🇷🇺 issued medal for capturing Crimea on 20th [February 2014], while Yanukovych was still president.
Preparedness of 🇷🇺 forces was raised on 12th [February 2014]. Then 🇷🇺 realised their mistake, and forced Yanukovych to flee country.

It seems like there soon will be another gesture of good will – in order to secure transport of grain, 🇷🇺 forces would leave Kherson district.

🇷🇺 internal poll (approximate numbers):

30% want to continue war in 🇺🇦, 25% with reservations, 28% indecisive, the rest strongly against. Most interesting are causes for support – belonging to the “russians” brand (still staying strong), material well-being (starting to notice problems), belief in might of 🇷🇺 army (significantly dropped).
In eyes of his supporters, Putin has brought 🇷🇺 up from it’s knees, won multiple wars (2nd Chechen war, Georgia, Tuzla Island), restored might. He also has rebranded “russians”, so the followers gladly accept it.
Now, economics are going down, there are signals of bad situation in regions (creation of national battalions as solution).
If respondents think, that regime is criminal, they significantly repel all politics, including war. If they support Putin, there is support to war, or indecisive.
There starts to appear problems with belonging to a brand, due to ethnic issues (huge losses among Buryat and Dagestan nationals), people start doubting Putin’s idea of the world and 🇷🇺.
Compared to beginning of war, there is significant loss of unconditional support (more than 40 points). More people think Putin’s regime is criminal, even if they support war.


More than 55k killed 🇷🇺, including PMC Wagner.
Aftermath of Lysychansk battle, 27 BTGs (9 brigades) have been brought to 🇷🇺 for restoration. In last 4 days 4 BTGs. 🇷🇺 mobilising everyone from recently captured territories, not much population left in Donetsk and Luhansk.
BBC identified 4.5k people buried with their first and last names.
Putin’s supporters would still reject all statistics as propaganda.
Currently approximately 135-150k 🇷🇺 fighting in 🇺🇦. Total 🇷🇺 losses could be up to 100k. Total rotated personnel 300-350k. Britain has also claimed 1/3 lost or wounded.
Most reliable way to track losses is comparing with vehicles, each tank should have at least 1 killed, most likely more.
Similarly in Afghanistan war, USSR reported 10k vehicles lost, making 15k personnel losses look low.

Latest posts